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Food prices in international markets spiked upwards in 2008, doubling or more in a matter of 
months. Evidence is still being compiled on policy responses over the following two years, 
but new time series estimates of government intervention for the previous five decades allow 
insights into past policy responses to price fluctuations and spikes. This paper reviews the 
distortionary impacts of policies used by governments attempting to stabilize their domestic 
food markets. It then focuses on policy responses in the mid-1970s, as reflected in various 
annual indicators of distortions to producer and consumer incentives, before drawing out 
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How do governments respond to food price spikes?   
Lessons from the past  
 
Kym Anderson and Signe Nelgen 
 
1.  Introduction 
Food prices in international markets spiked upwards in 2008, doubling or, in the case of rice, 
trebling in a matter of months. The magnitudes of the price rises, and the speed of their 
subsequent fall back to trend, were similar to those experienced in 1974. Figure 1 shows real 
international prices for the five years around the earlier and most-recent spikes for three key 
grains and for groundnut oil (which also is an important food staple in numerous low-income 
countries). On both occasions, the rising price generated panic buying by individual 
households, especially of rice in Asia, which exacerbated the international price spike. Both 
episodes also lead to urban food riots in numerous low-income countries, and in some 
instances to a change in government. It is understandable that in such settings governments 
feel the need to be seen to be doing something to lessen the impact on those adversely 
affected in their country. 
[Inset Figure 1 about here] 
Evidence is still being compiled on policy responses in 2008-10, but how have 
governments responded in the past, and in particular how did policies react to that mid-1970s 
price spike? The next section of the paper briefly reviews the domestic market insulation 
impacts of agricultural policies used in the past by governments attempting to stabilize their 
domestic food markets. Those impacts include protecting producers in times of downward 
international price spikes (as in 1986) as well as protecting consumers in periods of upward 
price spikes – in each case at the expense of the other domestic group who otherwise would  
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have benefitted from the price movement. The main section then examines in detail the 
policy responses as reflected in various annual indicators of distortions to producer and 
consumer incentives during the years 1972 to 1976. The final section of the paper draws 
together some policy lessons from this evidence of past government responses to food price 
spikes. In particular, it draws attention to the fact that when many countries seek to reduce 
gyrations in their domestic food markets by altering trade restrictions at their national border, 
such actions are collectively self-defeating: they reduce the role that global trade can play in 
dampening fluctuations in international prices, and they prolong the adjustment process. 
 
2.  Past domestic market stabilization efforts 
 
Governments of almost all countries deliberately seek to reduce fluctuations in domestic food 
prices and in the quantities available for local consumption. There is a huge analytical 
literature on the economics of such price stabilization efforts. Its connection with trade policy 
was highlighted by Johnson (1975) immediately following the upward spike in world food 
prices in 1973-74. His analysis of grain prices suggested that if free trade in grain was in 
place in 1975, prices would be so much less variable – because trade could mitigate local 
supply variability – that only negligible quantities of carryover/storage would be profitable. A 
subsequent study of global food trade provided complementary results: using a stochastic 
model of world markets for grains, livestock products and sugar, Tyers and Anderson (1992, 
Table 6.14) found that instability of international food prices in the 1980s was three times 
greater than it would have been under free trade in those products.  
Such government intervention is in response to lobbying efforts from and society’s 
concern for groups destined to otherwise lose from exogenous shocks (Thompson et al. 2004, 
Freund and Ozden 2008) – although it needs to be kept in mind that stabilizing prices is not  
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the same as stabilizing real incomes of the target households. An additional justification 
sometimes given for such intervention in poor countries is that credit markets are 
underdeveloped, or inefficient because of local monopoly lenders, so low-income consumers 
and producers have difficulty smoothing their consumption over time as prices fluctuate.  
However, it is difficult for governments to stabilize even prices, let alone incomes for 
target households. Indeed, more than sixty years ago Hayek (1945) warned that such 
intervention is likely to lead to government failure that could reduce welfare more than the 
cost of the market failure it seeks to overcome, given the high cost of the information needed 
to do it well. The extensiveness of that required information is made clear in the seminal 
theoretical study by Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), and by the study of storage in particular by 
Williams and Wright (1991). 
One way countries try to achieve their stabilization objectives is by varying the 
restrictions on their international trade in food according to seasonal conditions domestically 
and changes in prices internationally. Effectively this involves exporting domestic instability 
and not importing instability from abroad. A simulation exercise by Tyers (1991) suggests 
that between three-fifths and three-quarters of the global cost of OECD agricultural 
protection is due to the insulating component of high-income countries’ policies. That 
practice has continued unabated despite the signing of numerous multilateral and preferential 
trade-liberalizing agreements over the past two decades. 
Another indication of how much governments are intervening for stabilization 
purposes is provided by annual estimates of national nominal rates of assistance (NRAs). A 
NRA captures the extent to which the domestic producer price differs from the most 
comparable international price at a country’s border. NRAs have been measured for all major 
farm products in more than 70 countries from the mid-1950s to 2007 in a recently completed 
study summarized in Anderson (2009). That study provides an ideal annual database for  
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analysing government responses to food price spikes, which is fully detailed in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008). 
As a prelude to looking at those distortion estimates, it is illustrative to compare the 
movements in their two components, namely domestic and border prices. Pursell, Gulati and 
Gupta (2009), for example, report pertinent prices for rice in India which reveal that the 
Indian government has been able to maintain an almost-constant real domestic rice price for 
decades despite huge fluctuations in the international price of rice. Similar if less-complete 
attempts have been made by most governments of South and Southeast Asia and in parts of 
Sub-Saharan Africa where rice is also a key food staple (Figure 2). As a result, especially 
since Asia produces and consumes four-fifths of the world’s rice (compared with about one-
third of the world’s wheat and maize), this market-insulating behavior of Asian and to a 
lesser extent African policy makers means that very little rice production has been traded 
internationally: less than 7 percent in 2000-04 (and less than 5 percent pre-1990), compared 
with 14 and 24 percent for maize and wheat. This insulating behavior of governments also 
means international prices are much more volatile for rice than for those other grains, as is 
evident for the two periods shown in Figure 1.  
[Inset Figure 2 about here] 
To get a sense of how much this practice varies across products, and whether it has 
changed much since policy reforms began around the mid-1980s, Table 1 reports the average 
across countries of the percentage point deviation each year of national NRAs for 12 key 
farm products around their trend value for the sub-periods before and from 1985. For most 
products that indicator is lower in the latter period, the exceptions being rice, wheat and (at 
least in developing countries) soybean. Rice had one of the smaller average deviations in the 
earlier period, but by the latter period rice shared the honour of the largest deviations with 
sugar and milk. Despite the general decline in deviations from trend, those annual percentage  
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point deviations since 1985 have been several times the average percentage NRA for the 
world as a whole (compare the final two columns of Table 1). 
[Inset Table 1 about here] 
That NRAs tend to be above trend in years of low international prices and conversely 
in years when international prices are high is clear from Table 2, which shows the extent of 
the negative correlation between the NRAs for various products and their international price. 
That coefficient globally and in high-income countries is negative for all but beef, and even 
in the various developing country regions it is negative in all but one-quarter of the cases. For 
almost all of those 12 products the (negative) regional correlation is highest for the South 
Asian region. Among the developing countries it is again rice, sugar and milk that have the 
highest correlation coefficients. 
[Inset Table 2 about here] 
The proportional deviation of the international price of a farm product from its long-
run trend value each year turns out to be highly significant when added to equations aiming at 
explaining NRA differences in the Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) database for those 12 
products over the full time series from 1955 to 2007. The other prospective explanatory 
variables are per capita income, an index of agricultural comparative advantage (farm land 
per capita) and a dummy for distinguishing export industries. Anderson et al. (2010) show 
that the price deviation variable is highly significant for the three grains, sugar, cotton and 
coffee, but is not significantly different from zero for non-staple livestock products and 
soybean. 
Yet another way of capturing this insulation phenomenon statistically is to estimate 
the elasticity of transmission of the international product price to the domestic market. 
Following Tyers and Anderson (1992, pp. 65-75), a geometric lag formulation is used by 
Anderson et al. (2010) to estimate elasticities for each product for all focus countries for the  
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period 1985 to 2007. The average of estimates for the short run elasticity range from a low of 
0.3 for sugar and milk to 0.5 for rice, wheat and pigmeat, 0.6 for cotton, cocoa, maize and 
poultry, and 0.7 for beef, soybean and coffee. The unweighted average across all of those 12 
key products is 0.54, suggesting that within the first year little more than half the movement 
in international prices is transmitted domestically. Even the long run elasticity appears well 
short of unity after full adjustment: the average of the elasticities for those 12 products across 
the focus countries is just 0.69.  
 
3.  Changes in the extent of distortions during the food price spike of the mid-1970s 
 
We turn now to the responses to the most extreme food price spike prior to 2008, focusing on 
the five years around 1974. The effects of government actions are reflected in the movement 
of domestic relative to international prices and thus in estimated NRAs. These are reported in 
Appendix Table B for the three key grains, for the important food staple of groundnut oil, and 
for all farm products for which estimates are available in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). In 
the case of rice, for example, the NRA for developing countries as a group was 7 percent in 
1972, but it fell to -27 percent in 1973 and -55 percent in 1974 before recovering slowly to -
24 percent in 1975 and -8 percent in 1976.  
 
3.1 Nominal assistance coefficients 
To compare the extent of the fall and rise of food prices in developing countries with that in 
high-income countries (where assistance rates are much higher), it is easier if the NRA is 
converted to an NAC (nominal assistance coefficient, defined as 1+ NRA/100). The rice 
NAC for developing countries fell from 1.07 in 1972 to 0.45 in 1974, which is similar 
proportionally to the fall for high-income countries, whose NAC also more than halved over  
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that short period, from 2.65 to 1.24 (Table 3). That means rice was still protected in high-
income countries even in 1974 (NAC>1), whereas in developing countries its domestic price 
averaged less than half the international price in that year.  
[Inset Table 3 about here] 
The NAC falls for wheat were not as severe as for rice, but were still substantial: from 
1.24 in 1972 to 0.71 in 1973 for developing countries, and from 1.05 to 0.88 for high-income 
countries over the same 12-month period. For maize the NACs fell even less than for wheat, 
bottoming out a year later at 30 percent lower for developing countries and one-eighth lower 
for high-income countries. And the fall was smaller again for groundnut oil. 
Considering all covered farm products, the NAC for developing countries fell by 
exactly one-third in the first two years before rising by almost the same amount in the 
subsequent two years. This was a little more than twice the extent of the fall and recovery for 
high-income countries, and is due mainly to Asia’s developing countries (see bottom segment 
of Table 3). What is remarkable is that these U-shaped paths over that 5-year period for this 
large sample of 75 countries are the mirror image of the inverted U-shaped paths of the 
international prices shown in Figure 1. This is so even if the depths of the former are not 
quite as big as the heights of the latter in proportional terms – confirming that there is at least 
some transmission of the international price changes to domestic markets.  
Table 4 reports for comparison the regional NRAs and regional consumer tax equivalents 
(CTEs) of agricultural policies. These two indicators are almost identical for high-income 
countries, reflecting the fact that most of the farm price distortions are coming from border 
measures in those countries. For developing countries, however, the CTEs are one-tenth 
lower initially than the NRAs (or rather their coefficient counterparts are), and they are 
negative on average, meaning consumers were paying less than they would under free  
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markets. However, note that the CTEs for developing countries decline less than do their 
NRAs by 1974, before rising back to slightly above their pre-shock level by 1976.  
[Inset Table 4 about here] 
 
3.2 Welfare and trade reduction indexes 
The cost of government policy distortions to incentives in terms of inefficiency of resource 
use and consumer spending tends to be greater the greater the variation of NRAs and CTEs 
across industries/products within the agricultural sector. It is helpful to have a single indicator 
of the overall welfare effect of each country’s regime of agricultural price distortions in place 
at any time, so as to be able to trace its path over time and make cross-country comparisons. 
To that end, the family of indexes first developed by Anderson and Neary (2005) under the 
catch-all name of trade restrictiveness indexes has been drawn upon to generate indicators of 
distortions imposed by each country’s agricultural policies on its economic welfare, and also 
on its agricultural trade. Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010) define and estimate a Welfare 
Reduction Index (WRI) and a Trade Reduction Index (TRI) for the same 75 countries as 
included in this paper, taking into account the fact that for some covered products the NRA 
and CTE differ. As their names suggest, each of these two new indexes captures in a single 
partial equilibrium indicator the direct welfare- or trade-reducing effects of distortions to 
consumer and producer prices of covered farm products from all agricultural and food price 
and trade policy measures in place. Specifically, the WRI (or TRI) is that ad valorem trade 
tax rate which, if applied uniformly to all farm commodities in a country that year would 
generate the same reduction in economic welfare (or trade) as the actual cross-commodity 
structure of agricultural NRAs and CTEs for that country, other things equal. 
The WRI measure reflects the partial equilibrium welfare cost of agricultural price-
distorting policies better than the NRA because it recognizes that the welfare cost of a  
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government-imposed price distortion is related to the square of the price wedge. It thus 
captures the disproportionately higher welfare costs of peak levels of assistance or taxation 
within the farm sector, and is larger than the mean NRA/CTE and is positive regardless of 
whether the government’s agricultural policy is favouring or hurting farmers. In this way the 
WRI and TRI go somewhat closer to what a computable general equilibrium can provide in 
the way of estimates of the welfare and trade (and other) effects of the price distortions 
captured by the product NRA and CTE estimates – and they have the advantage over a 
computable general equilibrium model of providing an annual time series. 
Summaries of those two indexes are provided for the major regions in the lower half of Table 
4. In 1972 the WRI was almost 50 percent for developing countries and almost 60 percent for 
high-income countries. Over the subsequent two years, that index went down by nearly one-
third in high-income countries but hardly changed for developing countries – even though the 
NAC for developing countries fell by one-third. Almost the same is true for the TRI: no 
change for developing countries, but a big drop (a halving) for high-income countries. This 
suggests for developing countries that the dispersion of NRAs among farm industries 
increased in individual developing countries, for example because NRAs for export industries 
became more negative to a greater extent than NRAs for import-competing farm industries 
became less positive. For high-income countries, if most of the assistance for farmers is 
provided by import restrictions such as variable levies to stabilize domestic prices, one would 
expect those levies to be reduced as international prices rise. 
 
3.3 Contribution of different policy instruments to the aggregate indicators 
To test the possibility in the previous sentence, it is necessary to attribute each industry’s 
NRA and CTE to a particular set of policy instruments. This is done in Table 5(a) for 
developing countries and Table 5(b) for high-income countries. The latter shows that in the  
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mid-1970s import restrictions were indeed the dominant form of assistance to farmers in 
high-income countries, with domestic and export subsidies accounting for less than one-sixth 
of the total NRA. Between 1972 and 1974 it was both import restrictions and export subsidies 
that contributed to the fall in the NRA for high-income countries, as they did to its 
subsequent rise. 
[Inset Table 5 about here] 
  For developing countries, by contrast, domestic price-depressing policies – especially 
export taxes – were the dominant policy instrument in 1972, although import restrictions and 
domestic producer subsidies played non-trivial roles as well. By 1974, though, import 
restrictions and domestic subsidies had been mostly suspended while the absolute 
contribution to the total NRA from export taxes and import subsidies hardly changed on 
average. As a result, the NRA for developing countries fell from 3 percent to -29 percent over 
those two years, before rising back to an average of almost zero again by 1976. 
  The contribution to the CTEs by different instruments was fairly similar to that for 
NRAs and so is not shown, but they are almost as important as the NRAs in terms of their 
contribution to the WRI and TRI. To attribute those index values to different policy 
instruments requires doing it separately for the producer and consumer sides of the market: 
each instrument share is computed by first converting the index percentage to constant 2000 
$US billions by multiplying it by the average value of production or consumption for that 
instrument group at the country level, and then dividing the dollar amount for each 
instrument by the country average value of production or consumption. The weighted average 
of the production and consumption components could give an overall attribution, but for the 
sake of transparency they are shown separately in Tables 6 and 7.  
[Inset Tables 6 and 7 about here]  
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For high-income countries, their WRI fall of one-third and the halving of their TRI by 
1974 are virtually all due to import measure changes, and the contribution from the 
consumption side is only a little greater than that from the production side. By 1976, 
however, both the WRI and TRI had risen by more than they had fallen in the previous two 
years, and both production and consumption of farm products in high-income countries were 
more distorted immediately after than before the price spike.  
For developing countries, the situation summarized in Tables 6 and 7 is more 
complex. First, because the export tax instrument dominated in 1972 for developing 
countries, the contribution to both indexes from the production side is greater than from the 
consumption side. Second, even though their average WRI and TRI did not increase by 1974, 
each of the two component parts did and especially on the production side. And third, those 
increases are all due to increases in export restrictions and some import subsidies and are 
despite substantial falls in the contributions from import restrictions.  
 
 
4.  Lessons from the past 
 
Clearly a lot happened to global agricultural market distortions during the brief spike in 
international prices of farm products in the mid-1970s. By way of summary, the key points 
that emerged from the above analysis are the following: 
•  The magnitudes of the price rises in 1973-74, and the speed of their subsequent fall, 
were very similar to those experienced in 2006-10; 
•  National NRAs tend to be above trend in years of low international prices and 
conversely in years when international prices are high;  
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•  The NAC for developing countries fell by exactly one-third between 1972 and 1974 
before rising by almost the same amount in the subsequent two years, which was 
slightly more than twice the extent of the NAC fall and recovery for high-income 
countries; 
•  By contrast, the WRI (TRI) went down by almost one-third (nearly halved) in high-
income countries but hardly changed for developing countries between 1972 and 1974 
– even though the NAC for developing countries fell by one-third, suggesting that the 
dispersion of NRAs among farm industries increased in individual developing 
countries; 
•  Between 1972 and 1974 it was both import restrictions and export subsidies that 
contributed to the fall in the NRA for high-income countries, as they did to its 
subsequent rise; 
•  For developing countries, where export taxes were the dominant policy instrument in 
1972 (although import restrictions and domestic producer subsidies played non-trivial 
roles as well), their import restrictions and domestic subsidies were mostly suspended 
by 1974 while the absolute contribution to the total NRA from export taxes and 
import subsidies hardly changed over those two years; 
•  For high-income countries, their WRI fall of one-third and the halving of their TRI by 
1974 are virtually all due to import measure changes, but by 1976 both the WRI and 
TRI had risen by more than they had fallen in the previous two years, indicating that 
agriculture in high-income countries was more distorted immediately after than before 
that mid-1970s price spike. 
These findings for the mid-1970s, together with the broader findings in Section 2 of a 
tendency for governments to use border measures to reduce the variability of domestic food  
13 
 
prices in general, are not dissimilar to what appeared to be the case in the most recent food 
price spike – although the data are not yet available to confirm that anecdotal impression. 
That beggar-thy-neighbor dimension of each government’s food policies ought to be 
of concern. It is worrying because it reduces the role that trade between nations can play in 
bringing stability to the world’s food markets: the more countries insulate their domestic 
markets, the more other countries perceive a need to do likewise, exacerbating the effect on 
world prices such that even greater changes in each nation’s NRAs are desired. By increasing 
the volatility of world markets as they seek to reduce domestic volatility, such actions by 
national governments are collectively self-defeating. Clearly there is scope for multilateral 
agreement to desist. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the most obvious place to seek 
restraints on varying trade restrictions (exports as well as imports), but the initial responses to 
proposals along these lines in the WTO’s current Doha round of trade negotiations has been 
at best cool to date. It remains to be seen whether, over time, responses become warmer or 
even cooler with the expected increase in volatility of international food markets as climate 
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Figure 1: Indexes of real international prices of rice, wheat, maize and groundnut oil, 1972-










Figure 1 (continued): Indexes of real international prices of rice, wheat, maize and groundnut 






(d) Groundnut oil 
 
 
Source: Authors’ derivation drawn from World Bank Pink Sheets of nominal prices 




Figure 2: Rice NRAs and international rice price, South and Southeast Asia, 1970 to 2005 
 
(left axis is int’l price in current US dollars, right axis is weighted average NRA in percent) 
 
 
 (a) South Asia 
 
Correlation coefficient is -0.79 




(b) Southeast Asia 
 
Correlation coefficient is -0.56 
Note: Countries included are Indonesia (except for 1970-74), Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand 
and Vietnam (except for 1970-85).   
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Figure 2 (continued): Rice NRAs and international rice price, South and Southeast Asia, 1970 
to 2005 
 
(left axis is int’l price in current US dollars, right axis is weighted average NRA in percent) 
 
 
(c) Sub Saharan Africa 
 
Correlation coefficient is -0.72 
Note: Countries included are Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana (except for 1983), Madagascar, 
Mozambique (except for 1970-75, 1997-98, 2002-04), Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania (except for 
1970-75), Uganda, Zambia. 
 
 




Table 1: Deviation of national NRA around its trend value,
a 12 key covered farm products,
b 
developing, high-income and all focus countries, 1965-84 and 1985-2004 
 






























sugar             
 
Rice  32  64  66  229  37  103  28 
Wheat  33  47  80  91  56  65  18 
Maize  36  33  53  58  43  41  7 
Soybean  46  117  75  61  56  94  3 
Sugar  53  66  179  173  132  116  42 
Tropical  cash 
crops             
 
Cotton  38  33  42  28  35  32  -5 
Coconut  22  20  na  na  22  20  -21 
Coffee  41  27  na  na  41  27  -12 
Livestock 
products             
 
Milk  76  69  239  190  200  137  88 
Beef  45  52  128  127  101  93  43 
Pigmeat  81  60  92  77  90  62  3 
Poultry  109  74  164  197  145  134  21 
 
a Deviation is computed as the absolute value of (residual – trend NRA) where trend NRA in 
each of the two sub-periods is obtained by regressing NRA on time. 
 
b Unweighted average of  national deviations. 
 
c For comparative purposes, the weighted average NRA is shown for all focus countries for 
the latter period. 
 




Table 2: Coefficient of correlation between regional NRA and international price, 12 key 
covered farm products,
a various regions, 1965 to 2007 
 















Grains, oils, sugar             
             
Rice  -0.19  -0.58  -0.51  -0.52  -0.10  -0.16 
(0.99) 
Wheat  0.01  -0.81  0.09  -0.12  -0.28  -0.41 
(0.85) 
Maize  -0.20  -0.70  -0.55  -0.04  -0.29  -0.57 
(0.71) 
Soybean  -0.15  -0.42  0.16  -0.27  -0.07  -0.18 
(0.30) 
Sugar  -0.57  -0.74  -0.57  -0.40  -0.69  -0.70 
(0.99) 
Tropical cash crops             
             
Cotton  0.28  -0.33  -0.16  -0.29  -0.74  -0.57 
(0.96) 
Coconut  na  -0.16  -0.14  na  na  -0.12 
(0.99) 
Coffee  -0.35  na  0.02  -0.30  na  -0.28 
(0.99) 
Livestock products             
             
Milk  0.19  -0.57  -0.70  0.33  -0.10  -0.31 
(0.98) 
Beef  0.20  na  0.05  0.55  0.29  0.32 
(0.97) 
Pigmeat  na  na  -0.53  -0.47  -0.60  -0.76 
(0.98) 
Poultry  0.59  na  -0.52  -0.78  -0.22  -0.34 
(0.87) 
 
a  Computed using the weighted average regional NRAs and a common international 
reference price for each product, from World Bank (2008).  
 
b Numbers in parantheses are the coefficient of correlation between the unweighted average 
regional NRAs and CTEs for individual covered products. For all covered products the 
coefficient is 0.93.  
 




Table 3: Nominal assistance coefficients
a for rice, wheat, maize, groundnuts and all farm 




1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Rice 
          Asia (excl. Japan)  1.07  0.72  0.43  0.76  0.92 
Africa  0.98  0.61  0.36  0.60  0.82 
Latin America  1.00  1.04  0.84  0.90  0.98 
All developing countries  1.07  0.73  0.45  0.76  0.92 
High-income countries  2.65  1.84  1.24  1.72  2.33 
            Wheat  
          Asia (excl. Japan)  1.31  0.72  0.83  0.97  0.94 
Africa  1.19  0.85  0.67  0.87  1.00 
Latin America  0.89  0.59  0.57  0.93  1.02 
All developing countries  1.24  0.71  0.75  0.95  0.96 
High-income countries  1.05  0.88  0.88  0.97  0.93 
            Maize 
          Asia (excl. Japan)  1.52  1.17  1.04  0.82  1.03 
Africa  1.03  0.90  0.69  0.83  0.92 
Latin America  1.06  0.89  0.81  0.85  0.84 
All developing countries  1.18  0.98  0.83  0.83  0.92 
High-income countries  1.13  1.06  1.00  1.03  1.04 
            Groundnut oil 
          Asia (excl. Japan)  1.08  1.00  1.00  0.69  0.86 
Africa  0.51  0.46  0.48  0.53  0.57 
Latin America  na  na  na  na  na 
All developing countries  0.92  0.88  0.78  0.63  0.75 
High-income countries  na  na  na  na  na 
            All farm products  
          Asia (excl. Japan)  1.18  0.90  0.69  0.87  1.04 
Africa  0.83  0.75  0.70  0.80  0.79 
Latin America  0.73  0.69  0.58  0.65  0.85 
All developing countries  1.01  0.83  0.67  0.82  0.96 
High-income countries  1.32  1.19  1.14  1.25  1.36 
 
a Nominal assistance coefficient, NAC = 1 + NRA/100 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008)  
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1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
NRA (%) 
          Asia (excl. Japan)  18  -10  -31  -13  4 
Africa  -17  -25  -30  -20  -21 
Latin America  -27  -31  -42  -35  -15 
All developing countries  1  -17  -33  -18  -4 
High-income countries  32  19  14  25  36 
 
CTE (%) 
          Asia (excl. Japan)  -5  -32  -28  -8  1 
Africa  -9  -18  -25  -13  -6 
Latin America  -19  -26  -35  -28  -9 
All developing countries  -9  -28  -29  -12  -2 
High-income countries  32  18  14  26  36 
 
WRI (%) 
          Asia (excl. Japan)  47  48  46  50  41 
Africa  55  52  53  48  49 
Latin America  38  41  52  49  27 
All developing countries  47  47  48  49  40 
High-income countries  59  43  41  51  72 
 
TRI (%) 
          Asia (excl. Japan)  29  25  24  36  25 
Africa  19  18  23  25  31 
Latin America  21  25  33  33  16 
All developing countries  25  24  25  34  24 
High-income countries  27  18  13  24  36 
 




Table 5: Contributions to total agricultural NRA
b from different policy instruments,
a by region, 1972-76 (percent) 
 
(a) Developing countries 
  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976   
Border measures             
Import tax equivalent  22  2  2  8  6   
Export subsidies  4  0  0  1  1   
Export tax equivalent  -26  -18  -24  -22  -9   
Import subsidy equivalent  -6  -5  -5  -2  -1   
ALL BORDER MEASURES  -22  -21  -28  -16  -4   
Domestic measures             
Production subsidies  26  7  1  1  1   
Production taxes  -1  0  -3  -3  0   
farm input net subsidies  0  0  0  1  1   
Non-product-specific (NPS) assistance except to inputs  0  0  0  0  0   
ALL DOMESTIC PRODUCTION MEASURES  25  7  -1  -1  2   
TOTAL NRA (including NPS and decoupled payments)  3  -14  -29  -17  -2   
             
Producer subsidy equivalent, in real 2000 US$ billion  7  -43  -141  -72  -9   
 
(b) High-income countries 
  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976   
Border measures             
Import tax equivalent  25  18  15  21  30   
Export subsidies  4  2  1  2  2   
Export tax equivalent  0  -1  0  0  0   
Import subsidy equivalent  -1  -3  -3  -1  -1   
ALL BORDER MEASURES  27  17  13  22  31   
Domestic measures             
Production subsidies  1  1  0  1  1   
Production taxes  0  0  0  0  0   
farm input net subsidies  0  0  0  0  0   
Non-product-specific (NPS) assistance except to inputs  1  0  1  1  1   
ALL DOMESTIC PRODUCTION MEASURES  2  1  1  1  1   
TOTAL NRA (including NPS and decoupled payments)  29  18  13  24  32   
             





a In the absence of data, it is assumed the share of input tax/subsidy, domestic production tax/subsidy and border tax/subsidy payments for non-
covered farm products are the same as those for covered farm products.  
b All entries have been generated by dividing the producer subsidy equivalent of all (including NPS and ‘decoupled’) measures by the total 
agricultural sector’s gross production valued at undistorted prices.  
c All entries have been generated by dividing the consumer tax equivalent of all measures by the total consumption value (at the farmgate level, 
valued at undistorted prices).  
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008)  
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Table 6: Contributions to Welfare Reduction Index for covered products by different policy instruments, by region, 1972 to 1976 
(percent) 
(a) Production side of economy 
             High-income countries  Developing countries 
   1972  1973  1974  1975  1976     1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
All measures  46  34  31  41  60     42  47  55  53  38 
Border measures  46  32  31  41  58 
 
38  44  44  43  35 
   Export tax  0  1  1  0  0 
 
16  31  34  28  18 
   Export subsidy  6  3  1  3  3 
 
3  1  0  1  1 
   Import tax  39  25  24  37  53 
 
15  4  3  11  13 
   Import subsidy  1  3  5  1  2 
 
4  8  7  3  2 
Domestic taxes & subsidies  0  2  0  0  2 
 
4  3  11  10  3 
   Production tax on output  0  0  0  0  0 
 
2  1  10  8  1 
   Production subsidy on output  0  2  0  0  2 
 
0  0  0  0  0 
   Farm input net subsidies  0  0  0  0  0 
 
2  1  1  1  1 
  
(b) Consumption side of economy 
          High-income countries        Developing countries   
   1972  1973  1974  1975  1976     1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
All measures  51  37  34  47  67     39  52  45  45  35 
Border measures  51  37  34  47  67 
 
39  51  44  43  35 
   Export tax  0  1  0  0  0 
 
11  37  30  24  15 
   Export subsidy  5  2  1  2  3 
 
3  1  0  1  1 
   Import tax  44  30  27  43  63 
 
21  4  3  14  16 
   Import subsidy  2  4  6  1  2 
 
5  9  10  4  3 
Domestic taxes & subsidies  0  0  0  0  0 
 
1  1  1  1  0 
   Consumption tax  0  0  0  0  0 
 
1  1  1  1  0 
   Consumption subsidy  0  0  0  0  0 
 
0  0  0  0  0 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).  
27 
 
Table 7: Contributions to Trade Reduction Index for covered products by different policy instruments, by region, 1972 to 1976 
(percent) 
(a) Production side of economy 
                 High-income countries  Developing countries 
   1972  1973  1974  1975  1976     1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
All measures  24  16  12  22  32     22  20  28  37  25 
Border measures  24  16  12  22  32 
 
22  24  27  33  25 
   Export tax  0  1  0  0  0 
 
15  29  32  26  17 
   Export subsidy  -4  -2  -1  -2  -2 
 
-2  -1  0  -1  -1 
   Import tax  29  20  17  24  35 
 
13  3  2  10  11 
   Import subsidy  -1  -3  -4  -1  -2 
 
-3  -8  -7  -3  -2 
Domestic taxes & subsidies  0  0  0  0  0 
 
0  -4  1  4  0 
   Production tax on output  0  0  0  0  0 
 
0  1  1  4  0 
   Production subsidy on output  0  0  0  0  0 
 
0  -5  0  0  -1 
   Farm input net subsidies  0  0  0  0  0 
 
0  0  0  1  1 
  
(b) Consumption side of economy 
               High-income countries        Developing countries   
   1972  1973  1974  1975  1976     1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
All measures  28  19  13  25  38     20  30  21  30  23 
Border measures  28  19  13  25  38 
 
21  30  21  30  23 
   Export tax  0  1  0  0  0 
 
10  36  28  22  14 
   Export subsidy  -3  -2  -1  -2  -1 
 
-2  -1  0  -1  -1 
   Import tax  33  23  18  28  41 
 
17  3  3  13  13 
   Import subsidy  -1  -4  -5  -1  -2 
 
-4  -9  -9  -4  -3 
Domestic taxes & subsidies  0  0  0  0  0 
 
0  0  0  0  0 
   Consumption tax  0  0  0  0  0 
 
0  0  0  0  0 
   Consumption subsidy  0  0  0  0  0 
 
0  0  0  0  0 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).  
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Appendix Figure A: Real domestic producer and international reference prices for rice, India, 
1965 to 2004 






Source: Pursell, Gulati and Gupta (2009).  
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Appendix Table A: International grain and groundnut oil prices, 1972-76 and 2006-10 
 
(constant 2000 US$/mt, using the US GDP price deflator) 
 




  (Canadian)  (Indica, 
5% 
broken) 
     
           
1972  239  434  188  1433  0.297 
1973  474  944  316  1760  0.310 
1974  628  1554  397  3237  0.333 
1975  493  928  327  2336  0.367 
1976  378  597  284  1882  0.394 
           
2006  186  261  105  831  1.167 
2007  250  272  137  1129  1.198 
2008  382  546  187  1791  1.190 
2009




237  388  138  1152  1.180 
 
a US GDP chained price index is 1.000 for 2000, from the US Department of Commerce’s 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov/national/Index.htm). It is provisional for 2009 
and assumed to be unchanged for the first 3 months of 2010. 




Appendix Table B: Nominal rates of assistance to rice, wheat, maize and groundnut oil, 
various countries, 1972 to 1976 
 (percent) 
(a) Rice  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Australia  15  6  15  23  26 
Bangladesh        -26  105  -5 
Brazil     19  -3  -4  1 
Colombia  -5  -38  -50  -37  -20 
Cote d'Ivoire  17  55  -21  34  70 
Dominican Republic  13  -26  -9  -4  -6 
Ecuador  8  -31  -38  -26  7 
Egypt  -33  -62  -77  -64  -27 
EU 9  -31  -61  -55  -19  0 
Ghana  5  -38  -58  -30  0 
India  0  -34  -67  -58  -36 
Japan  257  169  39  94  175 
Korea  88  11  -44  -4  48 
Madagascar  -1  -51  -64  -32  -31 
Malaysia  19  -3  -23  -17  74 
Nigeria  87  -4  -33  8  103 
Pakistan  6  -62  -68  -59  -46 
Philippines  23  -39  -53  -29  0 
Portugal  37  -16  -39  -12  0 
Senegal  29  -26  -60  5  42 
Spain  -47  -71  -65  -21  -18 
Sri Lanka  3  42  -22  -12  -16 
Taiwan  2  -24  -25  -15  3 
Thailand  -22  -21  -52  -40  -21 
Uganda  35  54  70  77  83 
United States  0  0  0  0  0 
Zambia  -59  -54  -30  -11  -24 
Asia (excl. Japan)  7  -28  -57  -24  -8 
Africa  -2  -39  -64  -40  -18 
Latin America  0  4  -16  -10  -2 
All developing countries  7  -27  -55  -24  -8 
High-income countries  165  84  24  72  133  
31 
 
Appendix Table B (continued): Nominal rates of assistance to rice, wheat, maize and 
groundnuts, various countries, 1972 to 1976 
(percent) 
(b) Wheat  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Argentina  -30  -42  -63  -36  -40 
Australia  12  -10  -8  -2  3 
Austria  9  -28  -23  -9  -19 
Bangladesh        39  140  -6 
Brazil  4  -30  5  39  81 
Canada  3  3  3  3  3 
Chile  -6  -68  -39  -35  -23 
Colombia  40  -6  -14  13  11 
Egypt  -24  -35  -48  -32  -22 
EU 9  -2  -30  -23  -9  -16 
Finland  34  6  11  48  37 
India  41  0  0  0  -3 
Japan  97  -8  -75  -85  4 
Kenya  -20  -52  -49  4  -2 
Korea  26  -20  -31  -20  -4 
New Zealand  11  11  11  11  11 
Pakistan  7  -69  -57  -14  -13 
Portugal  59  -10  -26  -8  4 
South Africa  87  7  -3  24  38 
Spain  -10  -31  -32  -2  -16 
Sudan  -29  -43  -51  -21  -11 
Sweden  -12  -36  -33  -9  -18 
Taiwan  65  8  -6  0  29 
Turkey  -8  -56  -22  -24  2 
United States  21  7  1  1  1 
Zambia  -68  -54  -44  -34  -30 
Zimbabwe  47  16  -23  -20  -28 
Asia (excl. Japan)  31  -28  -17  -3  -6 
Africa  19  -15  -33  -13  0 
Latin America  -11  -41  -43  -7  2 
All developing countries  24  -29  -25  -5  -4 




Appendix Table B (continued): Nominal rates of assistance to rice, wheat, maize and 
groundnuts, various countries, 1972 to 1976 
(percent) 
 
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
(c) Maize 
          Argentina  -28  -25  -28  -45  -58 
Australia  0  0  0  0  0 
Austria  103  27  -2  17  25 
Brazil  20  -5  -12  0  -5 
Cameroon  0  0  0  0  0 
Canada  4  3  2  2  2 
Chile  -9  31  -48  -51  -19 
Colombia  -3  -12  -35  -30  -25 
Ecuador  83  39  39  52  57 
Egypt  -8  -19  -28  -13  -15 
EU 9  73  19  2  22  39 
Ghana  38  -16  -23  -14  2 
India  106  55  28  -31  0 
Indonesia  -22  -5  -22  -24  -3 
Kenya  0  -8  -26  3  7 
Madagascar  0  0  0  0  0 
Nigeria  287  108  66  122  256 
Pakistan  19  -41  -44  -11  -24 
Philippines  43  -8  -3  6  22 
Portugal  47  0  -22  30  30 
South Africa  7  -25  -38  -31  -29 
Spain  65  19  -15  30  33 
Thailand  5  -8  -2  -5  -3 
Uganda  0  53  0  0  0 
United States  6  4  0  0  0 
Zambia  -42  -40  -46  -64  -32 
Zimbabwe  -42  -40  -46  -49  -60 
Asia (excl. Japan)  52  17  4  -18  3 
Africa  3  -10  -31  -17  -8 
Latin America  6  -11  -19  -15  -16 
All developing countries  18  -2  -17  -17  -8 
High-income countries  13  6  0  3  4  
33 
 
Appendix Table B (continued): Nominal rates of assistance to rice, wheat, maize and 
groundnuts, various countries, 1972 to 1976 
(percent) 
 
(d) Groundnut oil  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Ghana  0  0  0  0  0 
India  8  0  0  -31  -14 
Nigeria  -59  -63  -35  -10  -10 
Senegal  -39  -53  -64  -45  -39 
Sudan  -54  -60  -63  -58  -50 
Uganda  0  0  0  0  0 
Zambia  -67  -64  -68  -76  -55 
Zimbabwe  -68  -72  -70  -74  -79 
Africa  -49  -54  -52  -47  -43 
Developing countries  -8  -12  -22  -37  -25 
 
Note: Included EU 9 countries are: Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom. NRAs are weighted using national values of production at 
undistorted prices as weights.   
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
 